Professor Jiang Xuechen has revived interest in applying game theory to the American-Iranian conflict, suggesting that true victory lies not in traditional military triumph, but in avoiding a decisive defeat. His provocative analysis posits that the ongoing strife will not conclude with a clear American victory but will evolve into a drawn-out war of attrition that alters the balance of global power. Jiang asserts that modern wars are not measured by the scale of destruction or military might but by each side’s capacity to endure the costs of conflict relative to their opponent.
The Nature of Modern Warfare
This perspective has gained considerable traction, particularly following the dissemination of Jiang’s lectures and geopolitical analyses on social media platforms. But what weight do the views of figures like Jiang carry? Are they merely random voices, or do they represent underlying agendas linked to states, corporations, or obscured interests? The accuracy of their predictions often vindicates their analyses, reinforcing their relevance in contemporary discussions.
According to Jiang, the United States and Iran are engaged in a complex, multi-stage game where the rules shift with each move. The focus is not merely on direct confrontation, but also on anticipating the responses of one’s adversaries. Thus, any military escalation prompts a chain of reciprocal decisions that complicate the course of the war over time. The challenge, therefore, is not initiating conflict but ensuring its resolution on acceptable terms for both parties.
The Economics of Conflict
From a game theory perspective, the stronger player may succeed in tactical battles yet ultimately lose the overall game if the costs of continuing are greater than the anticipated gains. Jiang posits that Iran may aim to prolong the conflict, escalating operational costs and expanding the theatres of warfare, thereby making it increasingly difficult for the United States to secure a definitive victory. The U.S., he notes, will inevitably target Iran’s internal stability, yet Iran’s strategy will not be to defeat America militarily, but rather to thwart a clear political triumph.
The longer the war endures, the greater the economic pressures, increased military deployment costs, and complications in maintaining global alliances. Conversely, Washington seeks to uphold deterrence without slipping into an indefinite open-ended war, as such a conflict risks depleting resources and diverting attention from other strategic interests, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.
The Law of Escalation
One of Jiang’s key insights, referred to as the “Law of Escalation,” emphasises that success does not stem from overwhelming force, but from managing escalation effectively. Each party seeks to intensify pressure on the other while simultaneously avoiding the crossing of a threshold that leads to uncontrollable confrontation. Thus, the ability to manage escalation takes precedence over maximising military strength; any miscalculation could lead all involved to outcomes that none desire.
Moreover, Jiang hints at the possibility of tacit agreements among factions within the conflict, wherein the ultimate target may be external nations. He suggests that in order for major powers to sustain their supremacy, they must extract concessions from the broader world, leading to inevitable regional divisions and potential Iranian incursions into nearby countries.
Prospects for Resolution
In his interpretation of war’s conclusion, Jiang applies game theory to describe how players may shift to a new equilibrium where de-escalation becomes the least costly option for both parties, even if neither achieves its initial objectives. He asserts that most significant historical wars have ended when the cost of continuation outweighs the cost of negotiation, rather than through the complete military incapacitation of one side.
Nonetheless, Jiang’s analyses should be viewed as interpretative rather than definitive truths. His predictions have attracted attention, particularly following their alignment with real-world events; however, some researchers critique his method for heavily relying on historical measurements and assumptions that may be difficult to quantify scientifically. Doubts about his academic background also persist.
In summary, game theory provides a valuable framework for understanding the American-Iranian conflict as a prolonged competition over fundamental interests, characterised by negotiations under duress and reciprocal decision-making rather than merely traditional military engagement. From this perspective, the resolution of war will depend less on the magnitude of force employed and more on each party’s ability to manage escalation, withstand attrition, and persuade their opponent that the costs of continuing the conflict have surpassed those of settlement.